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I. INTRODUCTION

The Montana Supreme Court Advisory Commission
(Advisory Commission) submitted a proposal to amend Rule 68
of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure on September 19, 1998.
In an Order dated October 20, 1998, the Montana Supreme
Court proposed the amendment to the bench and bar, and
initiated a comment period until February 19, 1999.1 Earlier, at
its mid-year meeting in 1996, the American Bar Association
(ABA) adopted a resolution regarding Rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Offer of Judgment Rule. 2 The ABA
Report concludes Rule 683 is "deeply flawed" because it is not
available to plaintiffs, it only shifts costs, not attorney's fees,
and it gives no discretion to judges if unfairness results. 4 With
the
Advisory
Commission proposal
specifically
under
consideration in Montana, it is time to analyze the intent of Rule
68 and these two proposals.
Currently, Rule 68 does not create strong incentives for
settlement, which is the rule's intended purpose. 5 Generally,
attorney's fees are the single biggest cost in litigation. By only
shifting costs, but not attorney's fees, the rule's purpose of
promoting settlement is significantly diminished. Moreover, it
is neither fair nor appropriate that only defendants are allowed
to make offers of judgment.
This denies plaintiffs the
opportunity to facilitate case settlement. Previous efforts in

1. See In Re: Proposed Amendments to the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure
(Oct. 20, 1998) (order initiating 120 day comment period for proposed amendments to
MONT. R. Civ. P. 68).

2. See Walter H. Beckham & Lawrence J. Fox, Report on Offer of Judgment
Legislation, 1996 ABA Section of Tort and Insurance Practice and Litigation Section
(Feb. 5, 1996) (on file with author & ABA) [hereinafter Beckham & Fox]. Only the
Resolution Adopted by House of Delegates, February 5, 1996, is ABA policy. The "Report
on Offer of Judgment Legislation" and the 'Offer of Judgment Procedure" are not ABA
policy.
3. References to Rule 68 will include Rule 68, FED. R. Civ. P., as well as Rule 68,
MONT. R. Civ. P., which are identical.
4. Beckham & Fox, supranote 2, at 9 4.
5. See 7 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE T 68.02 (2d ed.
1994).
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Montana to amend Rule 68 have been unsuccessful. 6 Likewise,
7
efforts to amend Federal Rule 68 have been unsuccessful.
As a trial court judge, I am encouraged by the Montana
Supreme Court's willingness to consider amending Rule 68. In
the Thirteenth Judicial District, civil jury trials are currently
scheduled three to six deep, dockets are becoming increasingly
crowded, and scheduling is becoming more and more difficult. It
is my belief Rule 68 does not sufficiently promote settlement
incentives, which would alleviate some of these docket problems.
To test this hypothesis, all civil cases in Yellowstone County
between 1994 and 1997 were researched to determine how many
offers of judgment were filed. Those cases where an offer of
judgment was made were then individually reviewed to
determine how many offers were accepted, how many were
rejected, and in how many cases costs were imposed. Based on
this analysis, it appears clear the current offer of judgment rule
in Montana is not accomplishing its stated purpose of promoting
settlements.
This article is organized as follows: First, the Montana
experience with Rule 68 is analyzed. Second, the proposed
Montana Supreme Court and ABA amendment to Rule 68 and
the policy considerations in support and opposition to these
proposals are set forth. Third, offer of judgment rules in other
jurisdictions will be summarized with special emphasis on those
states which allow both sides to make an offer and which allow
attorney's fees to be shifted. Lastly, a conclusion is set forth
recommending that the Montana Supreme Court amend Rule
68.
Montana is at a crossroads. Montana can provide bonafide
settlement incentives by adopting either the Montana Supreme
Court proposal or the ABA proposal. Alternatively, Montana
can simply do nothing and miss a great opportunity to better
6. As a legislator, the author sponsored House Joint Resolution No. 1 in the 1993
Legislature, which would have allowed both plaintiffs and defendants to make offers of
judgment and would have shifted attorney's fees as well as costs. H.R.J. Res. 1 failed,
primarily due to concerns that this was an area for the Montana Supreme Court to
address without legislative intervention. H.R.J. Res. 1, 53d Leg. (Mont. 1993).
7. In 1983 and 1984, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee unsuccessfully
proposed amendments in an effort to address the ineffectiveness of Rule 68. See
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 337, 361-67 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Proposed Amendments];
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 102 F.R.D. 425, 432-37 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Proposed Amendments].
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effectuate case settlements. Indeed, Montana would be well
served by adopting either one of the proposals amending Rule
68. For perspective, the background of Federal Rule 68 will be
analyzed below to give a bit of history behind the debate.
A. Background Of FederalRule
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was first
implemented by the Supreme Court in 1937.8

Of interest,

Federal Rule 68 was adopted from the state statutes of
Montana, Minnesota, and New York.9 As noted earlier, Rule 68
has not lived up to its expected purpose of encouraging
settlement and thus, has been criticized accordingly. 10 The
Federal Rules Advisory Committee has proposed amendments to
Rule 68, but these proposals have not been implemented."
Arguably, the single biggest problem with Rule 68 in its
current form is that "costs" does not typically include attorney's
fees. The seminal case decided by the Supreme Court on this
issue is Marek v. Chesny,' 2 where the Court held the term
"costs" as set forth in Rule 68 "was intended to refer to all costs
properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or
other authority."13 Later, in Delta Air Lines v. August, 14 the
Court restricted its earlier ruling and held that "costs" will
15
generally only include costs awarded under Rule 54(d).
Because costs do not generally include attorney's fees, which are
the major expense of litigation, offers of judgment are seldom
made, let alone accepted. 16 Part II of this article bears this
conclusion out.

8. FED. R. CIv. P. 68 advisory committee's notes. See also Delta Air Lines v.
August, 450 U.S. 346, 372-74 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), for a good discussion of
the history of Rule 68.
9. See Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 374 n.2.
10. See 1983 Proposed Amendments, supra note 7, at 363-67; 1984 Proposed
Amendments, supra note 7,at 433-37.
11. See 1983 Proposed Amendments, supra note 7, at 361-67; 1984 Proposed
Amendments, supra note 7, at 432-37.
12. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
•13.
Id. at 9.
14. 450U.S. 346(1981).
15. Id. at 352-361 (Rule 54(d)(1) and (2) provides in pertinent part: .. costs other
than attorney'sfees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party... Claims for
attorney's fees and related nontaxable expenses shall be made by motion.. .) (emphasis
added).
16. See Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6-9
(1985).
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The second biggest problem with Rule 68 is that only
defendants can make offers of judgment. 17
Although a
successful plaintiff may recover his costs under Rule 54,18 Rule
68 clearly gives defendants an advantage in litigation due to the
mandatory nature of cost shifting in Rule 68.19
II. THE MONTANA EXPERIENCE WITH CURRENT RULE 68
In order to objectively evaluate the effectiveness of Montana
Rule 68, the author researched the 4,653 civil cases filed in
Yellowstone County between January 1, 1994, and December 31,
1997. In all, offers of judgment were made in only 59 of these
cases. 20 Thus, in only approximately 1.3% of the cases in
21
Yellowstone County (the busiest civil calendar in Montana)
was an offer of judgment actually made. The specifics of those
cases where an offer of judgment was made are analyzed below.
A. Ineffectiveness of Montana Rule
Perhaps the best way to present the data is by way of a
22
graph.

Civil Cases
Offer of Judgment
Filed
Offer of Judgment
Accepted
Costs Assessed

1994

1995

1996

1997

Totals

1276

1136

1107

1134

4653

23

13

16

723

59

0

1

1

0

2

1

0

1

3

1

17. FED. R. CIv. P. 68 ("[A] party defending against a claim may serve upon the
adverse party an offer to allow judgment. . .") (emphasis added).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 54 ("[Closts other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs..
19. See Simon, supra note 16, at 8-9.
20. See Thirteenth Judicial District Court Statistics, Yellowstone County Clerk of
District Court (1994-97) (on file with the author).
21. See 1997 Annual Report of the Montana Judiciary, Table 6, at 16.
22. See supra note 20.
23. It is possible additional offers of judgment will be filed, as many of these cases
are active.
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The review of four years of recent cases readily
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Rule 68. Over 4,600 cases
were filed in that four year period. While it is still conceivable
that additional offers of judgment may be filed in the later cases,
at least one full year has passed since the 1997 cases were filed.
In Yellowstone County, a civil case is typically tried within 1224
18 months of filing.
As can be seen from the graph, while a very small number
of cases have an offer of judgment filed in them, in even fewer
cases is the offer of judgment actually accepted. In fact, in the
over four thousand cases filed, an offer ofjudgment was accepted
only twice.25 In the first case, an offer of judgment was filed for
$100.00.26 Later, after the first offer of judgment was refused, a
second offer of judgment was filed in the amount of $4,100.00.27
The offer of judgment was then accepted by the plaintiff and the
case was settled for $4,100.00. In the second case, the defendant
28
offered $3,000.00 and the plaintiff accepted.
Likewise, in only three cases during this four year period
were costs assessed after an offer of judgment was refused and
the verdict came in less than the offer. In the first case, the
defendant initially offered $8,000.00 and then amended the offer
of judgment to $10,000.00. The plaintiff rejected both offers and
the jury returned a verdict of $10,000.00. Thus, the plaintiff
had to pay defendant's costs of $919.00, which accrued after the
second offer of judgment was made. 29 In the second case, two
offers of judgment were made, one for $30,000.00 and one for
$50,000.00. Neither of the offers was accepted and the jury
verdict came in at $20,235.00. Accordingly, the defendant was
awarded his costs in the amount of $1,262.15.3 0 In the third
case, the defendant was awarded $3,178.00 in costs after a
$15,000.00 offer of judgment was made because the jury
awarded only $2,025.00.31
In one other case of note, a plaintiff attempted to make an
offer of judgment. The defendant objected to the plaintiffs offer
24. See supranote 20.
25. See supra note 20.
26. See Offer of Judgment, Sullivan v. Yakawich, No. DV 95-304 (May 22, 1995).
27. See id. (Dec. 5, 1995).
28. See Offer of Judgment, Carranco v. Daniel, No. DV 96-799 (June 4, 1998)
(acceptance occurred on June 11, 1998).
29. See Offer of Judgment, David v. Ruden, No. DV 94-1176 (Oct. 12, 1995).
30. See Offers of Judgment, Lowery v. German, No. DV 95-984 (July 30, 1996 &
Sept. 19, 1997).
31. See Offer of Judgment, Trullender v. Strobel, No. DV 97-380 (Aug. 27, 1998).
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offer of judgment. In the end, the case settled for an undisclosed
amount. 32 This case is interesting because it indicates that at
least some plaintiffs would like to make offers of judgment.
The offers of judgment that were made ranged from a low of
$50.00 to a high of $225,000.00. 33 The $225,000.00 offer is
somewhat of an anomaly as the second highest offer of judgment
was $60,000.00, and most of the offers of judgment were in the
$5,000.00-$10,000.00 range. 34 Of course, some cases may have
settled due to movement caused by the offer of judgment, but
very few offers of judgment were actually accepted. These
results are in conformity with national studies which conclude
that Rule 68 is rarely effective in achieving settlement. 35
Attorney surveys also confirm that Rule 68 is seldom used and
does not facilitate settlement. 36 Thus, based upon the statistics
of civil cases in Yellowstone County and the general conclusions
referenced above, it is clear Rule 68 does little to encourage
settlement. Due to the limited effectiveness of Rule 68, other
jurisdictions have amended their versions of Rule 68 in various
ways. The Montana Supreme Court and the ABA have both
proposed amendments to Rule 68. These two proposals are
analyzed below.
III. THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT PROPOSAL
As noted above, the Montana Supreme Court Advisory
Commission submitted a proposal to the Montana Supreme
Court on September 18, 1998, to amend Rule 68 of the Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure.3 7
The Montana Supreme Court
amended the proposal and requested comments from the bench

32. See Offer of Judgment, Burton v. Cowley, No. DV 94-116 (Aug. 15, 1997).
33. See supra note 20.
34. See supranote 20.
35. See Michael E. Solimine & Bryan Pacheco, State Court Regulation of Offers of
Judgment and Its Lessons for Federal Practice, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 51, 52
(1997) [hereinafter Solimine & Pacheco]. "Even in its present form, the option provided
by Rule 68 is apparently rarely used." Id. See also Edward H. Cooper, Rule 68, Fee
Shifting, and the Rulemaking Process, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108
(Larry Kramer ed., 1996). "Rule 68 has been viewed by many, including me, as an
uninteresting provision that remains on the fringe of procedure because it has been little
used to scant effect." Id.; See also 1984 Proposed Amendments, supra note 7, at 433
(stating Rule 68 is rarely used).
36. See JOHN E. SHAPARD, LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF AMENDMENTS TO RULE 68,
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1995).

37.

See supra note 1.
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and the bar on the proposed rule change. Comments are to be
submitted by February 19, 1999, which provides for a one
hundred twenty (120) day comment period.3 8 The proposed
amendment is discussed below.
A. Rule Language
The Montana Supreme Court proposal is relatively simple,
particularly when compared to the ABA proposal discussed later
in this article. A complete copy of the Montana Supreme Court
proposal appears in Appendix A. This proposal deletes the rule
as it currently exists and substitutes a new rule, essentially
39
adopted from Wyoming.
The first of the two most important changes in the Montana
Supreme Court proposal is found in the first sentence which
allows "any party" to make an offer to settle a lawsuit. 40 This
cures one of the two defects in the current rule by allowing
plaintiffs to also make an offer. Of interest, the title "Offer of
Judgment" is changed to "Offer of Settlement."
The time period for when an offer can be made is also
changed. The current rule allows an offer to be made up to ten
(10) days before trial. The new rule allows an offer to.be made
sixty (60) days after the complaint is served, up to thirty (30)
days before trial. 41 This amendment may reduce last minute
settlements which waste the time of the court, counsel, parties
and jurors.
The procedure after an offer is accepted is the same as the
current rule. Likewise, an unaccepted offer is also considered
withdrawn after ten.(10) days and inadmissible in court, unless
42
there is a separate hearing to assess costs.
The second and biggest amendment is the section defining
"costs"- now including attorney's fees. 43 The ramifications of
this change are discussed in detail below.
The proposal
concludes similar to the current rule by allowing later offers,
and allowing offers before the damage phase of a trial, if it has
been bifurcated. 44
38.
39.
Advisory
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See supra note 1.
See Proposed Amendments to Rule 68 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure,
Commission Note, at 3.
Id.
See id. at 2.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 3.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/3

8

Fagg:
Judgment
Rule:
Let's Provide Bonafide
OFFER
OF
JUDGMENT
RULE Settlement Incentives
1999Montana Offer of

B. Rule History
The history of this proposal is necessarily brief. The
Advisory Commission Note states the rule was "essentially
adopted from the Wyoming rule."45 However, the commission
note indicates that attorney's fees were added to the definition of
costs by the Montana Supreme Court. 46 This addition is very
important and is discussed in detail below. The history of the
Wyoming rule is less important due to the addition made by the
Montana Supreme Court to include attorney's fees as costs.
While the author applauds the Montana Supreme Court's
47
addition, the specific genesis of that amendment is unknown.
C. Policy Considerations
Policy ConsiderationsSupporting The Montana Supreme Court
Proposal
As noted in other parts of this article, the purpose behind
Rule 68 is to promote settlement. Currently, as evidenced by
the Yellowstone County experience, Montana Rule 68 does not
significantly promote settlement.
However, by allowing
plaintiffs and defendants to make an offer of settlement, the
opportunity to achieve settlement increases significantly. There
will probably be little, if any, debate by the Montana bar to
allow both plaintiffs and defendants to make an offer of
settlement.
On the other hand, the proposal to allow attorney's fees to
be assessed as costs if an offer of settlement is turned down and
the offeree is not more successful at trial will raise significant
debate. The biggest factor supporting the Montana Supreme
Court proposal is that putting attorney's fees at issue will put
teeth into Rule 68. An offer of settlement must be seriously
considered when rejecting it not only subjects a party to pay his
own attorney's fees but also the opposing party's attorney's fees
from that point forward.
Financial risk is an important factor in lawsuits. There is
no question that putting attorney's fees in the mix will
significantly increase case settlement discussions, and
45.
46.
47.
comment

Id.
See id.
The author spoke to a Montana Supreme Court Justice who declined to
on the amendment because the matter is pending before the court.
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ultimately, case settlements. This is important and appropriate.
A party will be put on notice that attorney's fees are at risk from
that point forward by the offer of judgment. There is no
stratagem. A cold, calculated assessment of the case is then in
order. Risk and gain are evaluated. This reckoning, which may
well lead to settlement, is the single most persuasive argument
in favor of the Advisory Commission's proposal, as amended by
the Montana Supreme Court.
Holding the offeree accountable for attorney's fees after the
offer is turned down, and the offeree is less successful at trial, is
fair. After all, if a reasonable offer is made, turned down, and
the jury determines the value of the case to be less than the
offer, why should the prevailing party have to pay their
attorney's fees from that point forward. The case should have
settled. If it had settled, no additional attorney's fees would
have been incurred.
The Montana Supreme Court proposal is also a simple one
which will be easily understood by the Montana bench and bar.
In fact, the proposed rule is substantially similar to the current
rule, with the noted changes regarding attorney's fees and
allowing plaintiffs to make an offer of settlement. In comparison
to the ABA proposal which makes significant changes to Rule
68, the Montana Supreme Court's proposal is straightforward
and simple.
Likewise, the implementation of the rule and the effect of
the rule will be straightforward and simple. Unlike the ABA
proposal, the Montana proposal does not have either the "undue
hardship" safety valve or the 25% margin for error component,
which will lead to increased complexity.
The Montana Supreme Court has obviously had a
significant hand in the drafting of the proposed rule, which
bodes well for future interpretation of Rule 68. The court should
give effect to the rule's purpose, as shown by their important
contribution to the Montana proposal. This is encouraging.
In summary, the Montana Supreme Court proposal should
prove an effective and potent weapon for settling cases. By
adding attorney's fees to costs, the Montana Supreme Court has
taken a bold, yet warranted, step in improving the intent of Rule
68. There are, however, some policy considerations opposing the
proposed rule which are set forth below.
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Policy ConsiderationsOpposing the Montana Supreme Court
Proposal
As with the ABA proposal discussed next, the primary
opposition to amending Rule 68 centers on access to justice
issues. As attorney's fees are the hammer which will promote
settlements, attorney's fees are also the hammer which could
force potential litigants out of the litigation arena if faced with
paying the opposing party's attorney's fees. Thus, those less
fortunate may be further disenfranchised from litigation if
attorney's fees are on the table. This issue has been the primary
argument used by opponents throughout the "English Rule"
debate. When a party has to consider paying not only his own
attorney's fees, but also his opponent's attorney's fees, he may
feel compelled to settle a case he would prefer to take to trial.
Another argument against the Montana Supreme Court
proposal is that litigation pushing the envelope of acceptable
legal precedent may be discouraged. An argument can be made
that some of the best advances in American civilization have
been made by creative lawyers moving beyond established
precedent.
For example, products liability litigation has
undoubtedly made consumer products safer. Likewise, there
can be little question that working conditions have improved for
blue collar Americans in the last 100 years due in part to trial
attorneys holding employers accountable through litigation
involving unsafe working conditions. Concededly, some of this
progressive litigation may be curtailed if Rule 68 is amended as
called for by the Montana Supreme Court proposal or the ABA
proposal.
Like the ABA proposal, there is the chance that the
Montana Supreme Court proposal may actually increase
litigation due to arguments over accepted or rejected offers, or
arguments over whether or not costs should be assessed and the
amount of those costs. These side arguments could become more
prevalent as the issue of attorney's fees is introduced.
Finally, while the Montana Supreme Court proposal is
simpler and more straightforward, it lacks the safeguards some
argue are necessary to make Rule 68 equitable in its application.
One such safeguard in the ABA proposal is the 25% margin of
error rule. Another safeguard is the discretion given to the
judge to waive Rule 68 sanction costs if undue hardship would
result. As a judge, this outlet is both a blessing and curse. It is
a blessing because there may be certain cases when the effect of
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the rule will be too draconian. It is a curse because all too often
parties will attempt to get out of paying attorney's fees for less
than compelling reasons.
In summary, the policy considerations opposing the
Montana Supreme Court proposal center on the assessment of
attorney's fees. Just as the assessment of attorney's fees is
essential to making Rule 68 effective, it is that potential
assessment which spawns the biggest arguments against any
amendment allowing attorney's fees to be a part of costs. The
policymaker in this case, the Montana Supreme Court, should
receive some thoughtful and provocative comments from the
bench and bar on this point.
IV. THE ABA PROPOSAL
The American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted a
resolution on February 5, 1996, asking Congress to consider a
specific "Offer of Judgment Procedure" before enacting any fee
shifting rules or legislation. 48 The ABA did not specifically
endorse the enactment of the offer of judgment legislation,49 but
wanted to present "a thoughtful and balanced procedure" in the
fee shifting debate. 50
A. Rule Language
The ABA proposal itself is broken down into twelve sections.
A complete copy of the ABA proposal appears in Appendix B. A
brief review of the proposal is set forth below.
Section 1. Offer Of Judgment
Section One cures one of the two biggest defects of Rule 68
by allowing "any party" to make an offer to settle a monetary
damage claim. The offer must be made at least sixty (60) days
after the complaint is served and no later than sixty (60) days
before the trial date. 51 This is a significant step in the right
direction in amending Rule 68 because it allows the plaintiff, as
well as the defendant, to make an offer to settle a case. The
current rule diminishes the settlement possibilities by half
because only one party may make an offer of judgment.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at 1.
See Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at 1.
Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at 86.
See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 1.
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Section 2. Form Of Offer Of Judgment
The form of the offer of judgment is important, as more than
one party has been tripped up by failing to define precisely the
offer being made to that party's detriment. 52 Section Two has a
number of specific requirements: the offer must be in writing; it
must specify the money offered; and it must specifically state
whether the offer includes costs, attorney's fees, interest, and
anything else that may be awarded. It is clear Section Two
intends offers to be as clear and unambiguous as possible.
Section 3. DeterminationOf Applicability
Section Three, which was later added to the original
proposal, allows a party upon application to know from the
beginning of the lawsuit whether this rule applies or not. 53 The
court may defer ruling on the applicability of this rule until after
judgment is obtained.
The early determination of the
applicability of the rule may be strategically important for a
trial attorney.
Section 4. Time PeriodDuring Which Offer Remains Open
To be a valid offer, the offer must remain open for at least
sixty (60) days. If an offer does not state how long it remains
open, it shall be deemed to remain open for up to sixty (60) days
before the trial, unless the offer is withdrawn.5 4 It is obviously
the intent of the drafters of the ABA proposal to provide
sufficient time for the opposing party to consider the offer of
judgment.
Section 5. Extension Of Time Period During Which Offer
Remains Open
Section Five first giveth, and then taketh away. Section
Five states the offeree may apply to the court to extend the time
an offer will remain open. However, the offeror may withdraw
the offer if the court extends the time for the offer to remain
open. Section Five also includes a good cause standard for the

52. See, e.g., Holland v. Roeser, 37 F.3d 501 (9th Cir. 1994) (where a stated
limitation of fees was ambiguous and thus plaintiffs who had accepted an offer of
judgment were entitled to recover post-offer fees).
53. See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supranote 2, at § 3.
54. See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supranote 2, at § 4.
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court to use when determining whether to extend the time an
55
offer remains open.
Section 6. Acceptance Of Offer
An offer must be accepted in writing, without qualification,
and within the specified time period. 56 Once again, it is clear
the ABA proposal drafters do not want any ambiguities in the
process. It is understandable that the offer must be in writing.
However, it is interesting to note the offer must be accepted
"without qualification." This area could be amended in the
future to allow a counter-offer. On the other hand, since both
parties can make an offer of judgment, the offeree could reject
the proposed offer and submit their own offer. Thus, in the final
analysis, the "without qualification" language does not hinder
settlement opportunities.
Section 7. Refusal Of Offer
Any offer not accepted within the time period set forth in
the offer is deemed refused. 57 This section was inserted to
prevent any misunderstanding between the parties which could
occur as the result of a late acceptance of an offer.
Section 8. Withdrawal Of Offer
Generally, an offer, once made, may not be withdrawn
before the expiration time stated in the original offer. The
exception is with consent of the court "for good cause shown and
to prevent manifest injustice."58 It is important that it takes
meeting a stringent standard to withdraw an offer.
This
difficult standard discourages withdrawals of offers before the
opposing party has had adequate time to analyze the offer.
Section 9. Inadmissibility Of An Offer Not Accepted
An unaccepted offer is not admissible until the proceeding
assessing costs and fees. 59 This is important because an offeror

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 5.
See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 6.
See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 7.
Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 8.
See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 9.
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does not want his offer presented as evidence to the factfinder,
who may consider it to be an admission of liability or case worth.
Section 10. Subsequent Offers
A party may make more than one offer of judgment.
Significantly, if more than one offer is made and not accepted,
and the offeror is able to seek costs and fees, then the offeror
may seek costs and fees under any one of the unaccepted
offers.60
Section 11. Effect Of Rejection Of An Offer
Section Eleven is the heart of the ABA proposal. Section
Eleven addresses what happens when an offer is not accepted
and the offeror is more successful at trial than the terms of the
offer of judgment. If this occurs, the offeror files the offer and
proof of service of the offer after final judgment or disposition.
However, a judgment stemming from a settlement agreement
does not trigger fee shifting unless the settlement agreement
61
provides for that result.
The court, after allowing both parties to submit proposed
findings, will enter judgment using the 25% plus or minus rule.
This rule was the critical factor in winning the support of both
the pro-plaintiff Section of Litigation and pro-defendant Section
of Tort and Insurance Practice for the ABA proposal. The 25%
plus or minus rule works as follows: If a plaintiff does not accept
an offer and the final judgment is 75% or less of the offered
amount, the plaintiff must pay the offeror's costs incurred after
the offer was made, including reasonable attorney's fees and
expenses. Expert witness fees and expenses are not included as
However, in no case may the costs exceed the
expenses.
62
judgment.
On the other hand, if a defendant does not accept an offer
made by a plaintiff and the judgment is more than 125% of the
offer, the defendant shall pay the plaintiffs costs incurred after
the offer was made, which again include reasonable attorney's
fees and expenses. Expert witness fees and expenses are not

60.
61.
62.

See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 10.
See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 11.
See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 11(a).
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included as expenses. Again, the costs awarded cannot be
63
greater than the judgment.
When the court compares the offer of judgment with the
final judgment, the final judgment may not include costs,
attorney's fees, etc., unless the offer of judgment specifically
included those amounts.6 If attorney's fees are awarded under
either a contract or court rule, those attorney's fees are excluded
65
from the judgment and thus not allowed as an offset.
As a final safety valve, the court may reduce or eliminate
entirely the fees and costs shifted "to avoid undue hardship, or
in the interest of justice, or for any other compelling
reason... ,"66 As a judge who is interested in encouraging
settlements, the author hopes that judges will refrain from
exercising this safety valve unless an extraordinary situation is
presented. The rule would be abated if parties who are made to
pay the other side's attorney's fees and costs went to the court
and had that obligation diminished, or reduced entirely, for less
than exceptional reasons.
The final safety valve in section eleven provides that
attorney's fees must be reasonable, they must be calculated on
an hourly rate, and the reasonableness of the fees will be
considered in the context of the case's complexity and the
attorney's qualifications. 67 In any case, the attorney's fees
awarded may not exceed the attorney's fees of the offeree, or, if
there is a contingency agreement, they cannot exceed those fees
which would have been incurred if the time put in by the
offeree's attorney was broken down on an hourly basis.68
Section 12. Non-Applicability
Section Twelve simply states this rule does not apply to
various categories of cases, including dissolution cases,
landlord/tenant cases, class actions, actions based on
constitutional rights or cases where "attorneys fees are
statutorily available to a prevailing party ....- 69

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 11(b).
See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 11(c).
See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 10(a), (b) & (d).
Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 11(d).
See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 11(e).
See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 11(e)(1) & (2).
Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 12.
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B. Rule History
The primary impetus for the ABA proposal was passage of
the Attorney Accountability Act, H.R. 988, by the United States
Congress on March 7, 1995.70 The Attorney Accountability Act
was part of the GOP's "Contract with America" and allowed
attorney's fees to be assessed after an offer of judgment was
made. In addition, the United States Senate and various state
legislatures were also debating attorney fee shifting bills. In
response, the ABA Section of Tort and Insurance Practice put
together a "Task Force" shortly after the Attorney
Accountability Act passed the House in order to look at
71
legislation effecting the offer of judgment rule.
The Task Force was formed to put together a
"comprehensive study of 'offer of judgment' rules." 72 After the
Task Force was formed, the primarily pro-plaintiff Litigation
Section requested representation on the Task Force, and two
73
people from that section served on the Task Force.
The Task Force reiterated the ABA's position opposing any
"loser pays" rules or legislation. However, the Task Force
recognized that fee-shifting proposals were being promulgated
across the United States and to be a player in that debate, they
needed to come up with a reasonable proposal, rather than
simply opposing loser pay rules.7 4 The proposal itself was first
recommended to the ABA House of Delegates at the 1995
Annual Meeting, but action was deferred until the 1996 midyear meeting because various ABA Sections, including the
Consortium on Legal Services and the Standing Committee on
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, needed more time to study
75
the proposal and its possible limitations on access to justice.
This delay also allowed state and local bar delegates to comment
on the proposal which, in turn, allowed the Task Force to
improve the proposed rule based on those comments. The final
report to the American Bar Association was adopted by the
House of Delegates on February 5, 1996.76

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at
Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at 1.
Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at 1.
See Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at
See Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at
See Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at
See Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at

1.

1.
1.
2-3.
2-3.
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C. Policy Considerations
Policy ConsiderationsSupporting the ABA Proposal
First and foremost, the policy in support of amending Rule
68 is to promote quick and reasonable settlements. 77 Settlement
negotiations are enhanced immediately because not only
defendants, but also plaintiffs, can make an offer to settle the
case. Right from the start, then, the possibility of settlement
has, in theory, doubled.
In addition, by putting attorney's fees on the table, the
incentive to take a thorough look at an offer has increased
tremendously, even considering the plus or minus 25% rule.
Simply put, the current "fear" of paying the other side's costs is
not significant enough to force a party to seriously consider an
offer.
Moreover, the ABA proposal is a practical one that allows
judicial discretion to prevent the rule from severely impacting a
party. Section eleven, discussed above, sets forth the standard
for allowing a judge to remedy any unjust results.
Likewise, the 25% margin for error rule provides protection
for parties. Any trial lawyer knows it is difficult to predict a
verdict with certainty. The 25% margin for error rule allows
room for error by attorneys when evaluating a case.78
The ABA proposal is also a balanced proposal due to the
"collaborative" input from the primarily pro-plaintiff Section of
Litigation and the primarily pro-defendant Section of Tort and
Insurance Practice. The proposal is neither pro-plaintiff nor
pro-defendant. The proposal simply encourages both plaintiffs
and defendants to accurately evaluate cases.7 9
Another benefit of the proposed rule is that it should reduce
speculative litigation.
Moreover, protracted defense of
undefendable lawsuits is limited if a party knows it may be
subject to the other party's attorney's fees. Likewise, excessive
and fruitless discovery and filing of unnecessary motions should
be reduced not only because of early settlement of cases, but also
if attorney's fees are on the table, a party may hesitate to make

77.
file with
78.
79.

Unedited Transcript at 1 89, 1996 A.B.A. Mid-Year Meeting (Feb. 5, 1996) (on
author & ABA) [hereinafter Unedited Transcript].
See Unedited Transcript, supra note 77, at 86.
See Unedited Transcript, supra note 77, at T 100.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/3

18

1999Montana Offer OFFER
OFRule:
JUDGMENT
Fagg:
of Judgment
Let's ProvideRULE
Bonafide Settlement Incentives
the case any more complicated and time consuming than
absolutely necessary.
In summary, the primary benefit of the ABA proposal is
that it is a thoughtful and balanced proposal written by trial
lawyers who understand the settlement opportunities as well as
the access to justice concerns. The proposal is a compromise
that allows both plaintiffs and defendants to be players in the
settlement game. Of course, more is at risk with attorney's fees
being part of that game, but it is the attorney's fees that will put
teeth into the offer of judgment rule.
Policy ConsiderationsOpposingthe ABA Proposal
The primary concern raised by opponents of the ABA
proposal centers on the access to justice issue. Specifically,
there is a concern that if attorney's fees may be assessed against
parties then those parties may be frozen out of the system
because they cannot afford the exposure to the other side's
attorney's fees.80 Opponents generally characterize the ABA
proposal as a fee shifting proposal which will deny American
81
citizens access to our court system.
Opponents also contend the 25% margin for error rule is
unfair to defendants in cases where a plaintiff rejects an offer
and pushes a case to trial but only receives a marginal verdict.
For example, if a plaintiff receives a $1,000 verdict, then Section
eleven of the proposal limits the attorney's fees and costs award
to $1,000. Thus, there is an argument that this is a pro-plaintiff
proposal, as opposed to the current Rule 68, which is generally
In fact, this is a legitimate
considered pro-defendant.8 2
argument. However, to ensure access to the judicial system by
all Americans, the 25% margin of error rule and judgment cap
rules are appropriate safeguards which force plaintiffs to decide
whether their case is really worth trying, but are not so punitive
that it shuts them out.
Another argument against the proposal is that it is simply
bad public policy in that it could spawn additional litigation.
Specifically, the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and
whether the safeguards set forth in the proposed rule should be
implemented are ripe for dispute. Thus, some conclude this

80.
81.
82.

See Unedited Transcript, supra note 77, at S 87.
See Unedited Transcript, supra note 77, at 88.
See Unedited Transcript, supra note 77, at 91.
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proposal will actually prolong litigation, not shorten it.8 3 While
the argument has some merit, the benefits of increased
settlement opportunities override this concern.
Last, there is an argument against the ABA proposal on the
basis an offer should be allowed to be withdrawn in fewer than
sixty (60) days if the person who made the offer learns of
information that shows the offer to be too generous.
The
argument espouses the thought that an offeror should be able to
withdraw their offer at anytime and that the sixty (60) day
period the offer must remain open is unreasonable.8 4 Frankly,
settlement offers are rarely, if ever, "too generous." Any settled
case is more of a win-win situation than the alternative of going
to trial, which results in a clear winner and a clear loser.
V.

OFFER OF JUDGMENT RULES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

A. States Which Allow Both Sides to Make an Offer of Judgment
In all, thirteen states have amended their offer of judgment
rule to allow both plaintiffs and defendants to make an offer of
judgment. The following states have made such a change:
89
Alaska,8 5 Arizona, 86 California, 87 Colorado, 88 Connecticut,
90 Michigan, 91 Minnesota, 92 Nevada, 93 New Jersey, 94
Florida,
North Dakota, 95 Wisconsin, 9 6 Wyoming. 9 7 Thus, more than a
quarter of the states have made the policy decision to allow
plaintiffs to also make an offer of judgment. Both proposals
incorporate this change in Section one. 98 This indicates a push,

83.
84.
85.

See Unedited Transcript, supra note 77, at f 98-99.
See Unedited Transcript, supra note 77, at 90.
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 68; ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.065 (Michie 1996).

86.
87,

ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 68.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 1993).

88.
89.
90,
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17-202 (West 1996).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-195 (West 1997).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79 (West 1997).
MICH. R. CT. 2.405 (1994).
MINN. R. CIv. P. 68.
NEV. R. Civ. P. 68.
N.J. CT. R. 4:58 (West 1992).
N.D.R. Civ. P. 68.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 (West 1995).

97.

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 68.

98. See Offer of Judgment Procedure, supra note 2, at § 1; Order supra note 1, at 2.
("[A]ny party may make an offer to an adverse party. . . .") (emphasis added).
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of sorts, to at least allow plaintiffs and defendants to make an
offer of judgment.
B. States Which Allow Attorney's Fees to be Shifted
Fewer states allow attorney's fees to be shifted after an offer
of judgment has been made and rejected. In fact, only six states,
Connecticut, 99 Florida, 100 Idaho, 1 1 Michigan, 10 2 Minnesota 10 3 and
Nevada, 1°4 allow attorney's fees to be shifted under certain
circumstances. The circumstances under which attorney's fees
can be shifted are beyond the scope of this paper. 105 The point is
that there is some movement across the country to recognize the
importance of allowing attorney's fees to be assessed as costs to
make Rule 68 a more effective settlement tool.
In addition, as noted earlier, "serious consideration is being
given by Congress and various state legislatures to allow for
'offer of judgment' fee-shifting proposals."10 6 We know now that
the Attorney Accountability Act, H.R. 988, did not pass the
United States Senate. The fact remains, however, that there is
discussion nationwide aimed at implementing the "loser-pays"
rule. While none of the six states referenced above have
implemented a strict English Rule, each of the states has
recognized that attorney's fees are the major cost of litigation
and have concluded that an effective offer of judgment rule must
include them.
VI. CONCLUSION

Rule 68 is, indeed, "deeply flawed." 10 7 The purpose of Rule
68 is to promote settlement. Unfortunately, Rule 68 is seldom
used and, when used, rarely effective. The experience of civil
cases in Yellowstone County filed over the last four years
mirrors experiences nationwide. Simply put, Rule 68 does not
work.

99.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-192a (West 1997) (cap at $350).

100.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79 (West 1997).

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

IDAHo R. Civ. P. 68.
MICH. R. CT. 2.405 (1994).
MINN. R. CIV. P. 68.
NEV. R. CIV. P. 68.
See Solimine & Pacheco, supra note 34, at 63-71, for a good overview of what

states are doing with Rule 68.
106. Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at 2.
107. Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at 1.
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The Advisory Commission should be commended for
bringing Rule 68 to the attention of the Montana Supreme
Court. Likewise, the Montana Supreme Court should be
applauded for including attorney's fees as costs in the proposal
and bringing Rule 68 to the attention of the bench and bar. In
addition, the ABA Task Force has done a commendable job with
their "comprehensive study of 'offer of judgment' rules." 08 This
author believes the Montana Supreme Court should implement
either the Advisory Commission proposal or the ABA proposal.
Either would be a significant improvement over the current rule.
The Montana Supreme Court proposal addresses the two
major concerns with Rule 68 in a simple and straightforward
manner. If concerns are brought up regarding this proposal,
then the Montana Supreme Court could turn to the ABA
proposal. Additional safeguards are in place in the ABA
proposal which weaken the rule, but address access to justice
concerns.
Rule 68 has a laudable purpose and we need to allow the
rule to work. Plaintiffs must be allowed to make offers of
settlement. Last, but not least, attorney's fees must be assessed
to provide bonafide settlement incentives.

108.

Beckham & Fox, supra note 2, at 1.
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APPENDIXA
The following is the amendment to Rule 68 of the Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure proposed by the Montana Supreme
Court on October 20, 1998.
Rule 68. Offer of settlement.
At any time more than 60 days after service of the
complaint and more than 30 days before the trial begins, any
party may serve upon the adverse party an offer, denominated
as an offer under this rule, to settle a claim for the money or
property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then
accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the
adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted,
either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance
together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the court
shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed
withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a
proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained
by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree
must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. As
used herein, "costs" includes attorney's fees. The fact that an
offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent
offer. When the liability of one party to another has been
determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or
extent of the liability remains to be determined by further
proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of
settlement under this rule, which shall have the same effect as
an offer made before trial if it is served within a reasonable time
not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to
determine the amount or extent of liability.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

23

MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW
Montana Law
Review, Vol.
60 [1999],
Iss. 1, Art. 3

Vol. 60

APPENDIX B
The following is the Offer of Judgment legislation proposed
by the American Bar Association House of Delegates on
February 5, 1996.
§ 1. Offer of Judgment.
At any time in a suit in which the claims are monetary
damages, or where any non-monetary claims are ancillary and
incident to he monetary claims, but at least 60 days after the
service to the complaint and not later than 60 days before the
trial date, any party may make an offer to an adverse party to
settle all the claims between the offeror and another party in the
suit and to enter into a stipulation dismissing such claims or to
allow judgment to be entered according to the terms of the offer.
When there are multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants,
this provision shall not apply unless; 1) in the case of multiple
plaintiffs, the right of each such plaintiff to recovery is identical
to the right of every other plaintiff and only one award of
damages may be made; and 2) in the case of multiple
defendants, the liability of each such defendant is joint and not
several.
§ 2. Form of Offer of Judgment.
An offer of judgment must be in writing and state that it is
made under this rule; must be served upon the opposing party to
whom the offer is made but not be filed with the court except
under the conditions stated in § 11; must specify the total
amount of money offered; and must state whether the total
amount of money offered is inclusive or exclusive of costs,
interest, attorney's fees and any other amount which the offeror
may be awarded pursuant to statute or rule. Only items
expressly referenced shall be deemed included in the offer.
§ 3. Determinationof Applicability.
At any time after the commencement of the action, any
party may seek a ruling from the court that this rule shall not
apply as between the moving party or parties and any opposing
party or parties by reason of the fact that an exception to the
rule exists or that one or more of the circumstances set forth in
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/3
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Section 11(e) for eliminating the application of the rule exists.
The court, upon receiving and considering any such application,
may grant the application, deny the application, or, in its
discretion, defer a ruling on the application until a later time
including a time after the entry of judgment. Any moving party
obtaining the relief sought under such a motion prior to
judgment may not, itself, use the rule as to any opposing party
to which the motion is applied.
§4. Time Period During Which Offer Remains Open.
An offer may state the time period during which it remains
open, which in no event may be less than 60 days. An offer that
states a time period of less than 60 days is an invalid offer. An
offer that does not state the time period during which it remains
open is deemed to remain open for 60 days, and thereafter
indefinitely until 60 days before the date set for trial unless
withdrawn pursuant to the provisions of §8 in which case it shall
have no further consequence under this rule.
§5. Extension of Time PeriodDuring Which Offer Remains Open.
Upon the application of the offeree, the court may, for good
cause shown, extend the time period during which an offer
remains open. If the court extends the time period during which
an offer may remain open, the offeror has the option of
withdrawing the offer.
§6. Acceptance of Offer.
An offer is accepted when a party receiving an offer of
judgment serves written notice on the offeror, within the time
period during which the offer remains open, that the offer is
accepted without qualification.
§7. Refusal of Offer.
An offer is deemed to be refused if it is not accepted within
the time period during which the offer remains open.
§8. Withdrawal of Offer.
An offer may not be withdrawn, except with the consent of
the court for good cause shown and to prevent manifest
injustice, before the expiration of the time period during which
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999
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the offer stated that it would remain open. An offer not made
subject to an expressly stated time period may be withdrawn
after 60 days by serving the offeree with written notice of the
withdrawal and shall have no further consequence under this
rule.
§9. Inadmissibility of an Offer Not Accepted.
Evidence of an offer not accepted is not admissible for any
purpose except in a proceeding to determine costs and attorney's
fees under a statute or rule permitting recovery thereof or
pursuant to an entry of judgment under §11.
§10. Subsequent Offers.
The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not
preclude any party from making subsequent offers. If more than
one offer made by an offeror is not accepted within the time
period during which the offers remained open, and therefore are
deemed to be rejected, the offeror would be entitled to seek feeshifting under §11(a) or (b) as to any one of such offers.
§11. Effect of Rejection of an Offer.
If an offer made by a party is not accepted and is not
withdrawn before final disposition of the claim that is the
subject of the offer, the offeror may file with the clerk of the
court, within 10 days after the final disposition is entered, the
offer and proof of service thereof. A final disposition is a verdict,
order on motion for summary judgment, or other final order on
which a judgment can be entered, including a final judgment,
but a judgment based on a settlement agreement will not result
in cost-shifting unless the parties expressly agree to costshifting rights under this rule. The court, after due deliberation
and after providing the parties to the offer an opportunity to
submit proposed findings, will enter judgment as follows:
(a) If a final judgment obtained by a claimant who did not
accept an offer from an adverse party is not greater than 75% of
the amount of the offer, the claimant offeree shall pay the
offeror's costs, including all reasonable attorney's fees and
expenses, but excluding expert witness fees and expenses,
incurred after the date the offer was made, except that the fee
award may not exceed the total money amount of the judgment.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/3
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Such recovery shall be in addition to any right of the offeror to
recover any other costs pursuant to statute or rule, except that
the offeror may not recover twice for the same costs, attorney's
fees, or expenses. If an offeree subject to attorneys fees under
this rule is entitled to attorney fees under court rule or contract,
the court shall determine the amount of those attorneys fees to
which the offeree is so entitled and exclude such fees from the
judgment for purposes of this subsection so that they are not
available to the offeror as a set off. This subsection (a) shall not
apply if the claimant offeree receives a take-nothing judgment.
(b) If a final judgment obtained by a claimant against an
adverse party who did not accept an offer from such claimant is
greater than 125% of the amount of the offer, the offeree shall
pay the claimant offeror's costs, including all reasonable
attorney's fees and expenses, but excluding expert witness fees
and expenses, incurred after the date the offer was made, except
that the fee award may not exceed the total money amount of
the judgment. Such recovery shall be in addition to any right of
the claimant to recover any other costs pursuant to statute or
rule, except that the offeror may not recover twice for the same
costs, attorney's fees, or expenses. If an offeree subject to
attorneys fees under this rule is entitled to attorney fees under
court rule or contract, the court shall determine the amount of
those attorneys fees to which the offeree is so entitled and
exclude such fees from the judgment for purposes of this
subsection so that they are not available to the offeror as a set
off.
(c) In comparing the amount of a monetary offer with the
final judgment, which shall take into account any additur or
remittitur, the latter shall not include any amounts that are
attributable to costs, interest, attorney's fees, and any other
amount which the offeror may be awarded pursuant to statute
or rule, unless the amount of the offer expressly included any
such amount.
(d) If both the offeree and the offeror may be entitled to
recovery of attorneys fees under rules or contract, the court shall
determine the amount of the recovery of such attorneys' fees by
either side by the application of this rule, of such other rule as
may apply to the recovery of fees, the language of any contract
providing for fees and general principles of law.
(e) The court may reduce or eliminate the amounts to be
paid under subsections (a) and (b) to avoid undue hardship, or in
the interest of justice, or for any other compelling reason that
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999
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justifies the offeree party in having sought a judicial resolution
of the suit rather than accepting the offer of judgment.
(f) The amount of any attorney's fees to be paid under
subsections (a) and (b) shall be a reasonable attorney's fee for
services incurred in the case as to the claims for monetary
damages after the date the offer was made, calculated on the
basis of an hourly rate which may not exceed as to the claims for
monetary damages that which the court considers acceptable in
the jurisdiction of final disposition of the action, taking into
account the attorney's qualifications and experience and the
complexity of the case, except that any attorney's fees to be paid
by an offeree shall not:
(1) exceed the actual amount of the attorney's fees incurred
by the offeree as to the claims for monetary damages after the
date of the offer; or
(2) if the offeree had a contingency fee agreement with its
attorney, exceed the amount of the reasonable attorney's fees
that would have been incurred by the offeree as to the claims for
monetary damages on an hourly basis for the services in
connection with the case.
§12. Nonapplicability.
This provision does not apply to an offer made in action
certified as a class or derivative action, involving family law or
divorce, between a landlord and a tenant as to a residence, or in
which there are claims based on state or deferral constitutional
rights.
This provision for fee shifting also does not apply to any
case in which attorneys fees are statutorily available to a
prevailing party to insure the ability of claimants to prosecute a
claim in implementation of the public policy of the statute.
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